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1 Donald Trump commands media attention to a greater extent than any US president in
memory.  His open bigotry,  vulgarity,  and obvious incompetence for the duties of  his
office are sources of outrage and despair throughout the world and among a majority of
Americans, although Trump’s behaviors are seen positively by a core of supporters who,
depending on the poll and the moment, range from a third to 40% of US voters. Observing
Trump on a day-to-day basis one can get the impression that he and his presidency are
sui generis and unprecedented. He is variously seen as the skilled or inadvertent creator
of a new majority political coalition (Grunwald, 2017; Wallerstein, 2017; Levenson, 2017;
Saunders, 2016), the subverter of his supporters’ belief in objective reality (Grunwald,
2017; Kakutani, 2018), the instigator of an American authoritarianism that could become
fascism (Gessen, 2016; Snyder, 2016), or the destroyer of US global power and legitimacy
(Lake, 2018; Cohen, 2017). Some of these and other authors subscribe simultaneously to
more than one of these portraits of Trump. 
2 Trump and the Republican Party’s ability to transform US politics will be decided by the
2018 and 2020 elections. In an earlier article (Lachmann, 2018), I argued that Trump’s
2016 victory was largely the fruition of long-standing Republican Party strategies. Rather
than assume that, we need to analyze if future Democratic defeats will led to outcomes
different than what would have happened under a victorious but Trumpless Republican
Party. For that reason, I focus here on Trump’s policies and accomplishments in the first
year and a half of his administration. Writing from the perspective of summer 2018, I seek
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to answer one basic question: to what extent is Trump just another, albeit flamboyant,
neoliberal Republican, adopting essentially the same policies as any of his 2016 primary
opponents  would have  done had they won the  nomination and presidency,  or  is  he
pushing the US toward a level of authoritarianism unprecedented outside of the Southern
states during the eras of slavery and segregation? Of course, the answer could be that he
is  doing  both,  and  we  need  to  remember  that  Trump’s  achievements  have  been
determined as much by the level and success of opposition from various sources as by his
Administration’s own desires and efforts. 
3 The best way to evaluate Trump is to review his policies in key areas. I begin by looking at
Trump’s single significant legislative accomplishment, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. I
then turn to his appointees’  work to overturn regulations enacted under Obama and
earlier presidents, and trace the effort to confirm Federal judges. Trade and immigration
are the issues Trump discussed most often as a candidate and as president. I  seek to
disentangle rhetoric from accomplishment in those two areas. I  then identify what is
new,  and  what’s  not,  in  Trump’s  foreign  policy.  Finally,  I  look  at  Trump  and  the
Republicans’  ongoing  efforts  to  suppress  voting  rights  and  to  attack  opponents  in
government and the media, while manipulating information. This review of the range of
policies is designed to disentangle rhetoric from accomplishment and provide the basis
for  a  conclusion  that  can  specify  the  extent  to  which  the  US  has  become  more
authoritarian under Trump and allow for an informed prediction of what is likely to
happen in the coming years. 
 
 Tax cuts: what’s new, what’s not 
4 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, like the tax cuts passed in 1981 under Reagan and 2001
under George W. Bush, gives the vast majority of its benefits to the wealthiest Americans.
In 2018, the first year of implementation, 52.1% of the cuts in individual, corporate, and
other Federal taxes go to the top 10% of taxpayers, 20.5% to the top 1%, and 7.9% to the
top 0.1%. In 2025, the last year when many of the law’s provisions remain in place, those
percentages remain the same for the top 10% and 1%, but for the top 0.1% they rise to
10.5%. The provisions that are permanent almost exclusively benefit the rich. So in 2027,
82.3% of the cuts will go to the top 1% and 59.8% to the top 0.1% (Tax Policy Center, 2017).
This  tilt  is,  in the last  years,  greater than in the Bush bill,  and significantly greater
throughout than for Reagan’s tax cuts. 
5 Business tax cuts consume a third of the cost of the bill (Sherlock and Marples, 2018: table
1). This is a reversal of the trend from Reagan to Bush of devoting a growing fraction of
tax cuts to rich individuals rather than corporations. Perhaps the Republican’ professed
justification for this shift, that it will improve the competiveness of U.S. firms, is the real
motive. However, corporate income is distributed far more unequally that total income so
this shift offers a hidden way to further tilt the tax cuts to the rich. In 2018 the top 1% will
get 10.6% of the cuts in individual income taxes but 43.8% of those in the corporate tax
(Wamhoff and Gardner, 2018). In any case, different sorts of rich benefit from corporate
income as opposed to personal income, and it could be that the key members of Congress
and the executive who wrote this bill are tied to different economic elites than those
wrote the Bush tax cut bills. 
6 One unique feature of this bill is that it targets taxpayers who live in states that vote
Democratic. The bill caps the ability to deduct local property taxes and state and local
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income taxes at $10,000.  Local taxes are substantial  higher on average in Democratic
states like New York and California than in ones that vote Republican. While this is an
unusually, perhaps unprecedentedly, large case of taxing political opponents, virtually all
news reports on the writing and negotiating over this bill suggest that Trump and his
aides were unengaged on any provision, including this one, other that ones that directly
affect Trump’s finances such as those that pertain to real estate investments. So if this is a
move  to  authoritarianism  in  tax  policy  it  is  one  spearheaded  by  Congressional
Republicans rather than Trump and his aides. 
 
 Republican deregulation 
7 The US has a long history of relatively heavy regulation in comparison with other rich
capitalist countries.  Beginning with the Carter Administration and accelerating under
Reagan, the US has been at the forefront of neoliberal deregulation (Prasad, 2006; Levy
and Shapiro,  2004).  Clinton did little  to reverse the Reagan-Bush I  deregulation,  and
signed  legislation,  passed  by  Republican-controlled  Congresses,  that  decisively  (and
disastrously) deregulated banking and telecommunications. In addition, Clinton signed
the 1996 National Securities Markets Improvement Act that required the Securities and
Exchange Commission to weigh the impact a potential regulation would have on, among
other  things,  “capital  formation”  in  the  financial  sector.  Clinton’s  record  on  the
environment was so weak that it was a key motive in Ralph Nader’s decision to run as a
third party candidate in 2000, throwing the election to Bush. 
8 Obama stands out as the first Democratic president since Johnson, and the first president
since Nixon, to seriously expand the regulatory state, mainly in the areas of environment
and health. (In other realms Obama continued the previous Democratic and Republican
approach that limited new regulations by imposing cost-benefit analysis and outright
rejecting regulations that pro-business government officials asserted would hamper firms
from expanding and hiring employees, or that capitalists or their lobbyists simply found
objectionable.) Thus, the extent of deregulation under Trump mainly reflects Obama’s
regulatory energy (which in turn reflected the necessity of relying on Executive Orders
when Republicans in Congress blocked proposed legislation to regulate CO2 emissions as
well as other forms of pollution) rather than any serious divergence from past Republican
administrations. Certainly Trump himself is motivated by personal animus, based in part
on racism, to undo Obama’s legacy, but all his deregulatory moves have been carried out
by appointees  with past  records  in  Republican Federal  or  state  government  and are
supported by key party backers. 
9 Of  course,  regulations  shape  subsequent  corporate  investments  and  strategies  and
therefore deregulation harms some capitalists who have made investment decisions on
the  assumption  that  the  regulations  are  permanent.  Not  surprisingly,  Trump’s
deregulation favors the fossil fuel industry over green energy. However, while in 2016
fossil fuels employed 1.26 million Americans and green energy only 782,000 in the US, the
rate of growth for green energy is far more rapid than for fossil fuels (Department of
Energy, 2017: table 1, figure 12). If Trump really wanted to increase American jobs and cut
the US trade deficit  he would have deepened Obama’s  green energy regulations,  but
instead he catered to his supporters in traditional energy firms, most notably the Koch
brothers, to a narrow set of workers in coal and oil, and to a broader set of supporters
who hear nationalistic and racist tones in Trump’s nostalgia for old industries. 
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10 Similarly, Trump’s acceptance of the big three US auto firms’ demands to reduce the fuel
economy standards they agreed to in return for bailouts under Obama will help those
firms by reducing the cost of manufacturing cars since fuel efficient engines are more
expensive. However, the smaller firms that make auto parts, and that employ four times
as many workers as the big three and have invested in the advanced technology needed
to make the parts for fuel efficient engines, will find themselves undercut by lower tech
foreign firms making the less exacting parts that auto assemblers will be able to use in
less efficient engines.  The end result of this deregulation will  be the transfer of jobs
abroad and of profits from smaller firms to the big three (Helper, Miller and Muro, 2018). 
11 Both parties favor some industries and regions over others, and the inauguration of a new
administration brings at least some new capitalists and industries into favored positions
and somewhat  exiles  others.  Green energy has  won backing almost  exclusively  from
Democrats  and fossil  fuels  came to  rely  almost  entirely  on  Republicans  even before
Trump’s  election.  Scott  Pruitt,  Trump’s  first  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)
Administrator, spent his entire career in Oklahoma as a servant of the oil industry, and
his selection for the EPA was based on that record. Similarly, Trump and his appointees’
efforts to sabotage the Affordable Care Act (aka Obamacare) reflect the party split over
health care. 
12 The Trump Administration stands out for the sloppiness of its deregulatory efforts. The
rules for writing, revising, or abolishing rules are elaborate and fixed by past laws, above
all the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. When an administrative agency does not
build a  sufficiently detailed and accurate record of  fact,  courts  can and do overturn
regulatory changes. The process for building a record and writing a rule takes years.
Trump’s appointees have been ambitious in their goals, but so far have wasted the first
eighteen months by not doing the serious work. This is in contrast to both Obama and
Bush II. Clinton had little commitment to enhancing regulation in any area, hence the
late rush to institute environmental rules in 2000 in response to Nader’s candidacy, most
of which were easily cancelled by Bush in 2001 since they had not made their way past all
the needed regulatory goalposts. 
 
 Judges 
13 Judges  ultimately  decide  whether  an  administration  has  met  the  requirements  for
regulatory changes. That is one reason judicial selection has become highly partisan. The
powerful role judges and especially the Supreme Court play in the American political
system has made judicial appointments, at least at the highest level, the subject of Senate
battles and at times popular mobilization. 
14 Until the Reagan Administration, Federal judgeships below the Supreme Court level were
controlled by senators who usually could name and almost always veto selections for
district judges and for seats on Appeals Courts that were by tradition linked to specific
states’  senators.  Beginning  with  Reagan,  the  balance  of  power  shifted  as  Republican
administrations looked to ideological organizations, above all the Federalist Society, for
names of vetted nominees. Democratic presidents were less rigid, more willing to defer to
senators, and concerned more with nominees’ gender and racial balance than with their
ideology. 
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15 The key change under Trump comes out of the Senate. In all previous administrations
senators were allowed to veto (“blue slip”) nominees for district judgeships in their own
state.  This gave the minority party some leverage in the states in which they had a
senator. Charles Grassley, the Senate Judiciary Committee chair, ended this practice when
Trump took office to ensure that while Republicans retain a Senate majority they could
push through any nominee. They were aided in this by the Democrats’ decision in 2013 to
end  the  filibuster  for  district  and  appeal court  judges,  lowering  the  confirmation
threshold to 51 from 60 votes. 
16 Supreme Court appointments historically were highly charged only in periods when the
Court was poised to decide (or had decided in ways many found extremely objectionable)
issues  at  the  forefront  of  public  contention:  slavery,  Reconstruction,  the  New  Deal,
segregation, prayer in schools, abortion, same sex marriage. Thus, in 1968 a coalition of
Republicans and southern Democrats filibustered President Johnson’s nomination of Abe
Fortas as Chief Justice, hoping that the new president would be a Republican and select
someone  who  would  reverse  or  at  least  limit  the  Warren  Court  rulings  on  race,
defendants’ rights, and prayer in schools. The gambit worked and Nixon shifted the Court
to  the  right,  with  the  enormous  exception  of  Roe  vs.  Wade,  which  moved  blocs  of
religious conservatives,  who would make abortion and judicial  selections their  prime
voting criteria, into the Republican Party. Beginning with Reagan, Republican Supreme
Court choices have been, with the exception of Bush I’s choice of David Souter, uniformly
at the right end of justices. The Supreme Court, even after Obama’s two appointments, is
the  most  conservative  overall  since  the  period  before  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  (FDR)
appointed a  majority  of  justices  (Bailey,  2013).  In  terms of  business  cases,  Alito  and
Roberts are the two most conservative justices since 1946 and Thomas, Kennedy, and
Scalia also were in the top ten in that ranking. Only Sotomayor is among the ten justices
least  likely  to  vote  for  business  — all  the  others  at  that  end of  the  spectrum were
appointed  by  FDR,  Truman,  Eisenhower,  Kennedy,  and Johnson (Epstein,  Landes  and
Posner, 2013). Trump’s two Supreme Court appointments merely continue the trend from
Nixon through Reagan to the Bushes. 
17 Numerous commentators, and of course Democratic politicians, see Mitch McConnell’s
decision to refuse to allow even a hearing, much less a vote, for Obama’s nomination of
Merrick Garland to replace the deceased Antonin Scalia in 2016 as unprecedented and a
break with Senate custom. Certainly, the refusal to hold hearings was new. However, in
substance, the result was the same as the filibuster against Fortas. What is different is
that this blockade was exclusively Republican, while Fortas was opposed, and supported,
by both Democrats and Republicans. In both 1968 and 2016 the open Supreme Court seat
became a central issue in the presidential campaign and both Nixon and Trump exploited
that opening with skill to bring out opponents of liberal Supreme Court decisions. 
18 What has changed are the ideological lines in both the Senate and on the Supreme Court.
Senators  in  the  two  parties  now are  almost  unanimous  in  opposing  nominees  from
presidents of the other party, and the senate itself is an anti-democratic instruction since
states regardless of their population each get to elect two senators. As a result, the 54
senators  who voted to  confirm Neil  Gorsuch to  the Supreme Court  in 2017 received
54,098,387 votes in their most recent election while the 45 senators who voted against
Gorsuch received 73,425,062 votes in their last election. In the history of the US there are
only two other such “minority justices,” Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito (McMahon,
2018). 
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19 Republican appointees are much further to the right now than they were under Nixon,
while Obama and Clinton’s choices, with the exception of Sotomayor, are less liberal than
those of Kennedy and Johnson. This shift to the right, and Republican dominance of past
and present Supreme Court nominations, now is affecting the US political system itself.
Republican Supreme Court appointees have voted to allow ever more extreme measures
(discussed below) by Republican controlled state governments to restrict voting rights
and to gerrymander state and Federal districts. In addition the Supreme Court finds that
unlimited political spending is a free speech right. These sorts of decisions make possible
the move toward authoritarianism I discuss at the end of this article. 
 
 Trade wars? 
20 Trade  is  one  area  in  which  Trump  departs  from  past  Republican  orthodoxy.  His
withdrawal, in his first week in office, from the Trans Pacific Partnership marked a break
from a string of trade deals dating back to the 1930s that steadily reduced tariffs and
eliminated other restraints on international trade, all while positioning the US at the
center  of  the  world  capitalist  system.  Trump was  both riding and fueling anti-trade
fervor, leading Hillary Clinton, who once had called the TPP the “gold standard” of trade
deals,  to  renounce  it  in  her  presidential  campaign.  Whether  she  would  have  again
reversed her position as president, and if so could she have gained Senate ratification for
the treaty, remains unknowable. 
21 Trump has gone well beyond a halt to further expansion of trade treaties by attempting
to abrogate, renegotiate, or undermine existing treaties. Such moves are a real departure
from past Republican service to the largest US corporations and banks that look to their
government to lubricate entry into markets abroad, even at the cost of US jobs. While
open global trade (as opposed to free movement of hot money around the globe) overall
adds to economic growth and jobs on a global basis,  it  also harms distinct groups of
workers and some firms as well. Trump spoke to those workers, and the dubious notion
that they switched from the Democrats to provide Trump with his margin of victory
underlies his political calculations and those of most Republicans and more than a few
Democrats. 
22 It remains to be seen if Trump can continue on a protectionist path as retaliatory trade
sanctions cost US firms foreign markets and lead to unemployment in various sectors.
Trump certainly has the option, which he took with South Korea, of reaching a deal that
give the US little or nothing more than it had before the confrontation and then declaring
success for his skills as a negotiator and deal maker. His supporters and most journalists
have so little understanding of trade and economics that Trump can sell them on such an
interpretation. Conversely, if Trump, by design or the miscalculation of his trade and
economic team, which is inexperienced and has little record of past success in any field
besides TV entertainment, falls into a trade war we will get a test of capitalists’ political
power. A trade war would definitely harm most US capitalists, and if they can’t force
Trump, either directly or through Congressional legislation, to reverse course, that would
be a clear sign that Trump has built a populist political base immune from the forces that
have set US economic policy since the 1930s at least. 
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 Immigration 
23 Trump made opposition to immigration the centerpiece of his campaign. His pledge to
build a wall and make Mexico pay for it was, along with chants of “lock her up,” the
emotional highpoint of his campaign rallies as a candidate and now as president. ICE
(Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal agency with the power to arrest
people in the US without legal documents) has removed fewer people from the country in
2017 than in 2016 and 2015, Obama’s last years in office. However, these overall numbers
mask a profound shift in who is being deported under Trump. 
24 Most of those deported under Obama were arrested at the border upon their arrival in
the US and then expelled relatively quickly afterwards. Border crossings and arrests have
been falling in recent years as Mexico’s improving economy and declining birth rate have
sharply reduced the factors pushing people into the US. No matter who was US president
in 2017 there would have been fewer arrivals at the border than in past years. 
25 Trump directed ICE to focus its efforts on undocumented immigrants who have been in
the US for years. So while arrests at the border declined, arrests in the interior rose
sharply from 65,332 in 2016 to 81,603 in fiscal year 2017, which since it includes the last
four  months  of  Obama’s  presidency  underplays  the  magnitude  of  the  policy  shift
(Valverde, 2017). The interior arrests are of people who often have relatives (spouses,
children, parents) who are US citizens or legal residents and who have jobs and homes in
the US and have been established in the country for years. Such arrests and deportations
are likely to increase in 2018 and subsequent years as ICE receives more resources and its
staff  is  encouraged  by  Trump’s  rhetoric  to  switch  from Obama’s  policy  of  targeting
undocumented aliens with criminal records to removing anyone without legal status. 
26 In addition, Trump ended “special status” for 45,000 Haitians and 2,500 Nicaraguans in
2017, and for 200,000 Salvadorans, 86,000 Hondurans, and 9,000 Nepalis in 2018. Special
status was created in 1990 under a law signed by Bush I to allow people fleeing wars or
natural disaster to remain in the US until conditions at home improved. Although the
hurricane that justified Hondurans special status was in 1999, efforts to make their US
residency  permanent  have  foundered  on  the  inability  to  pass  immigration  reform
legislation. Trump now has exploited the temporary nature of special status to expel
people who have lived in the US for decades and who, even more than those arrested in
the interior, are likely to have family who are US citizens as well as homes and jobs. 
27 Trump’s policy of deliberately separating parents from their children when ICE
apprehends families is unprecedented in the history of US immigration enforcement. This
deliberate cruelty appeals to a hard core of Trump supporters who value abuse of non-
white immigrants. The announced rationale, that it will deter undocumented immigrants
from attempting to enter the US, seems unsupported by the evidence, and if it in fact
were effective would not in any way diminish the cruelty of the policy. 
28 Trump’s efforts to terrorize undocumented aliens and to imprison those arrested and to
separate parents and children harken back to previous episodes throughout US history of
anti-immigrant rage and repression. Most recently, in 1991, more than 12,000 Haitians
fleeing the military dictatorship that overthrew elected president Jean Bertrand Aristide
were intercepted at sea and diverted to Guantanamo. Only 300 were judged to be bona
fide refugees and offered asylum, but when the majority of those were found to be HIV
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positive they were kept at Guantanamo along with their children and not allowed entry
to the US (Paik, 2016). 
29 Perhaps the closest parallels to Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric and actions came at the
end of World War I and during the Great Depression. In 1918 Congress passed the Sedition
Act and an Immigration Act. Together these two bills made it easy for the government to
deport non-citizens who were leftists or opposed to World War I. The Palmer Raids of
1919-20 were made possible by these two acts. From 1929 to 1936 hundreds of thousands
of  Mexican  immigrants  as  well  as  US  citizens  with  Mexican  sounding  names  were
deported in an effort, begun under Hoover and continued under FDR, to open jobs to
Anglo Americans (Balderrama and Rodriguez,  2006).  Both waves of deportations were
accompanied by efforts on the part of government officials to induce anti-immigrant
hysteria and to play off racist tropes. 
 
 Is Trump accelerating America’s loss of global
hegemony? 
30 Various authors (e.g. Lake, 2018; Cohen, 2017) argue that Trump is destroying the US’s
dominant  position in  the  world  with variously  deliberate,  or  ignorant  and therefore
inadvertent,  attacks  on allies  and  institutions  that  have  undergirded  American
hegemony. This is one realm in which Trump’s policies break with past Republican and
Democratic presidents. In his rhetoric and in his budget proposals Trump tracks Bush II,
Reagan, and John F. Kennedy in pushing for increased military spending. However, that is
combined with a professed willingness to make peace with America’s enemies and abstain
from military solutions. In his presidential campaign Trump repeated the lie that he had
opposed the Iraq war from the start, and he justifies his openings to Putin and Kim with
lines such as “Getting along with Russia, and getting along with China and getting along
with other countries is a good thing… not a bad thing” (quoted in Cochrane, 2018). 
31 It remains to be seen if Trump actually is able to negotiate accords with any country.
However, it is impossible to imagine Congressional Republicans holding still if Obama or
any Democrat, and perhaps any other Republican, had honored a North Korean dictator
with a summit while receiving not a single concession. Similarly, Republicans in Congress
so far  have been silent  as  Trump threatens to cancel  trade agreements and imposes
tariffs,  when in the past almost all Republicans were enthusiastic supporters of trade
agreements. More broadly, Trump’s unpredictability and his suggestions that he is not
committed  to  NATO  or  other  military  alliances  have  yet  to  be  challenged  by  any
Republican in more than words, such as by withholding their votes in Congress on an
item important to Trump. 
32 Trump’s trade and foreign policies are tests of the power that capitalists and the military
elite wield over the government. Marxist and elitist theory both predict that capitalists as
a class or as managers of the largest firms and banks hold a veto over economic policy,
including trade, even if they don’t set the policy themselves. Similarly, C. Wright Mills
(1956) and a few (e.g.  Lachmann and Schwartz,  2018;  Cox,  2018)  but not most of  his
successors see the military high command along with the heads of spy agencies like the
CIA as a distinct elite that controls decisions to deploy troops, build weapons, and form
and maintain military alliances. We will see if these powerful actors are able to block
Trump’s moves to engage in a trade war and to undo treaties and military alliances.
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Economic and military elites work through Congress as much as with the executive, and if
they are unable to deflect Trump’s attacks on existing trade and foreign policies that
would be a sign that elites’ usual bases of leverage over Congress as well as the presidency
have  been disrupted.  That  in  itself  would  be  a  measure  of  authoritarianism,  a  clear
indication that capitalists’ feeding of populist bigotry and jingoism had spun out of their
control, giving Trump unusual room to initiate new policies. As Marx wrote about the fate
of  the  bourgeoisie  after  Louis  Bonaparte’s  1851  coup:  “Out  of  enthusiasm  for  its
moneybags it rebelled against its own politicians and literary men; its politicians and
literary men are swept aside, but its moneybag is being plundered now that its mouth has
been gagged and its pen broken” (1935 [1852]: 60). 
 
 Voter suppression and attacks on truth 
33 All  the  policies  we  have  reviewed  so  far,  whether  Trump-initiated  or  extensions  of
longstanding  Republican  positions,  are  supported  by  only  a  minority  of  Americans.
Hacker and Pierson (2016), who offer the best overview and analysis of polling data, ask
how can a party win elections while taking unpopular positions.  Hacker and Pierson
argue that the GOP (Republican Party) has the motive and means for its rightward shift in
a base that reliably votes Republican in elections at all levels and has been pushed ever
further  to  the  right  by  three  forces:  “Christian  conservatism,  polarizing  right-wing
media,  and  growing  efforts  by  business  and  the  wealthy  to  backstop  and  bankroll
Republican politics.” Christian conservatives give “the GOP a substantial base of middle-
income voters who side with the party for mostly noneconomic reasons” but go along
with the party’s shift to the right on economic issues (idem, 2016: 251-252). 
34 Hacker and Pierson note but do not explain why Christian conservatives vote on “social”
issues like race and abortion rather than on economic issues, and why Republicans vote
more often than do Democrats. Both those tilts predate Trump, even though he won the
election thanks to them. Five factors,  all  of  which began years if  not decades before
Trump’s election, explain the widening gap in voter turnout between the Republican and
Democratic parties’  core constituencies.  Let us look at how (1)  voter suppression,  (2)




35 The twenty-first  century  Republican Party,  like  the  southern Democratic  Party  from
Reconstruction until passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, has sought to overcome the
unpopularity of its policies with a strategy of ensuring that its opponents are unable to
vote. For the southern Democrats those undesirable voters were the former slaves and
their  descendants  and also poor whites.  For  today’s  Republicans,  the goal  is  to  keep
African Americans, Latinos, the young, and the poor away from the polls while distorting
the information that they get about candidates and the operation of government. The
most common methods for suppressing the vote are “photo identification requirements,
proof of citizenship requirements, laws that introduce restrictions on voter registration,
restrictions on absentee and early voting, and restrictions on participation by felons”
after they are released from prison (Bentele and O’Brien, 2013: 1095). Such “restrictive-
access legislation” is enacted in Republican-controlled states “where African-Americans
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and poor people vote more frequently, and there are larger numbers of non-citizens”
(ibidem: 1098). The effect of such legislation is racist, but the goal is strategic: to ensure
that Republicans achieve undisputable control over states where their previous electoral
margins were narrow. 
36 The Supreme Court and lower Federal courts have been essential  to the Republicans’
voter suppression strategies. Judges allow a broadening array of methods that make it
difficult for the young and poor, who are more likely to be non-white, to vote. Voters are
required to show identification when they vote, and in an obvious ploy to favor their own
voters Republicans in Texas passed a law that accepts a concealed handgun permit but
not a university ID as proof of identity. A growing number of states purge their voter
rolls. In Ohio, “After skipping a single federal election cycle, voters are sent a notice. If
they fail to respond and do not vote in the next four years, their names are purged from
the rolls.” In 2018, the Supreme Court in a 5 to 4 decision, with the Republican appointed
justices in the majority, ruled such purges were permissible (Liptak, 2018). 
37 The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County vs. Holder, again with only the five
Republican appointed justices in the majority, eliminated the section of the Voting Rights
Act  that  required states  and localities  (mainly  in  the  South)  with  histories  of  racial
discrimination to receive preclearance from the US Department of Justice for any changes
in voting laws.  This opened the floodgates,  as Republican controlled states rushed to
enact  provisions  that  make  it  harder  to  vote.  Polling  sites  in  African  American
neighborhoods were closed, forcing voters to travel further to vote.  Early voting was
restricted. 
38 Most significantly, state legislatures were given free rein to engage in gerrymandering,
drawing Congressional and state legislative district lines in ways that favor one party.
Since Republicans gained control of a majority of state governments in the 2010 election,
they were able to draw district lines after the 2010 census that favor their party for the
rest of the decade. Shelby County vs. Holder ended the possibility of using the Voting
Rights Act to block gerrymandered district maps on grounds of racial discrimination.
However,  even before that  Supreme Court  ruling,  gerrymandering was fostered by a
devil’s bargain between the George H. W. Bush Administration and a few career African
American southern politicians following the 1990 census.  Until  then the 1965 Voting
Rights  Act  was  understood  to  ban  practices  that  diluted  African  American  voting
strength,  including  “packing”  black  voters  into  a  few  districts.  The  Bush  Justice
Department  proffered  a  new interpretation:  that  African Americans  could  only  have
representation  in  Congress  and  state  legislatures  if  they  were  represented  by  black
politicians rather than officials of various races who owed their election to black voters.
This interpretation was accepted by Federal judges, a majority of whom by then had been
appointed by Republican presidents, and blacks were packed into a few districts, thereby
pulling out black voters who had provided the margins of victory for numerous white
legislators throughout the South while elevating a few African American state legislators
into  safe Congressional  seats  (Berman,  2015:  chapter  7;  Daley,  2016:  chapter  7;
Zweigenhaft  and  Domhoff,  2018:  122-124).  This  was  the  turning  point  that  sharply
reduced  Democrats  in  southern  state  legislatures  and  made  possible  the  Republican
takeover  of  the  House  in  the  1994  election,  leading  to  ever  more  Republican  state
legislatures that engaged in ever more extreme forms of gerrymandering in the following
decades. 
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39 The Trump Administration is adding another voter suppression tactic. It seeks to add a
question  concerning  citizenship  to  the  2020  census.  The  goal  is  to  discourage  non-
citizens, who would fear the census being used by ICE to expose and deport them, from
filling out census forms. This would have the effect of reducing the population count in
states, and in areas within states, with large immigrant populations. That, in turn, would
shift representatives (and also the allocation of Federal funds that are distributed on the




40 The  increasing  harshness  and  vulgarity  of  election  campaigns  and  of  Republican
officeholders once in office has repelled many voters (Pacewitz, 2016: 248 and passim).
Conservative true believers and racists, motivated by rightwing media, still turn out to
vote. Indeed, after years of failing to get substantive benefits from government, such
voters will find racist showmen like Trump more attractive and worthy of the effort of
voting  than  sober  rightwing  technocrats  like  Romney.  For  such  diehard  Republican
voters,  the bluster and bigotry are features not bugs.  The Republican Party’s base of
supporters is concentrated in the former Confederate states and in other locales with
histories of racial conflict. 
41 Trump’s openly bigoted and vicious campaign and presidency are a culmination of long-
term trends, not a break with past Republican campaign practices. In a 1981 interview,
Lee Atwater, the manager of George H. W. Bush’s successful 1988 presidential campaign,
summarized the modern transformation of racism as follows: 
42 You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger” —
that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all
that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all
these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is,
blacks get hurt worse than whites… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than
even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger” (quoted
in Perlstein, 2012). 
43 Vulgarity and thinly veiled racism so far have disgusted younger and more liberal voters
as well as citizens without links to either party who are the least informed rather than
those who consistently vote Republican. There is limited evidence, from the few special
elections that have occurred since Trump became president, that his extreme vulgarity
and  open  racism  are  energizing  nominal  Democratic voters  and  discouraging
Republicans. If that trend holds for 2018 or 2020 then Trump will have undermined the
previously successful, because it was subtle enough, racist pillar of Republican rhetoric. 
 
Obstructionism 
44 People vote in hopes that if their candidates are successful they will be able to implement
their electoral promises. Republican obstructionism in Congress discourages committed
Democrats who are less likely to vote after harsh campaigns and with the prospect that
public policy will not change even if Democrats win smashing victories as they did in
2008. Both Mitch McConnell and Bob Dole, who were the leaders of the Republican Senate
minorities during the Obama and Clinton presidencies respectively, openly admitted that
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their strategies were to block as much of those presidents’ agendas as possible. They were
aided in those efforts by economic elites’ successes in obstructing progressive reforms
under  Obama.  Dole,  working under  a  smaller  Democratic  Senate  majority,  was  more
successful. Clinton had no significant legislative accomplishments during his eight years
as president, and the Republicans recaptured both the House and Senate after two years. 
45 McConnell faced a larger Democratic majority and was unable to prevent passage of the
Affordable Care Act, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
and other less sweeping legislation. The Democrats held the Senate for the first six years
of Obama’s presidency but lost the House after two, which meant that any further action
had to be accomplished by executive orders and other administrative actions that now
are in the process of being reversed under Trump. 
 
Money 
46 Political campaigns are privately financed in the US, giving capitalists enormous leverage
over candidates and then elected officials. The magnitude of money that the rich can
invest in campaigns has been magnified by two Supreme Court decisions In 2010, it ruled
in  Citizens  United  vs.  Federal  Election  Commission  that  the  Constitution  gives
corporations, non-profits, and labor unions the right to spend money without limits on
campaigns provided those expenditures are not directly coordinated with candidates’
campaigns. The Supreme Court in its 2014 McCutcheon vs. FEC decision struck down the
existing limits of $48,600 on the amount an individual could spend on contributions to
candidates, plus a $74,600 total on contributions to political parties and committees. Both
those  decisions  were  5  to  4,  with  the  Republican  justices  in  the  majority  and  the
Democrats in the minority. 
47 Few Americans are wealthy enough to take advantage of either decision, and the flood of
money allowed by the Supreme Court has overwhelmed the more limited amounts that
labor unions can afford to spend on campaigns. Below the presidential level, campaigns
are financed almost entirely by very rich individuals. So far, in the 2017-18 campaign
cycle  0.28%  of  Americans  have  accounted  for  68.3%  of  contributions  to  candidates
(OpenSecrets.org, 2018). Those contributions will be overwhelmed, as they were in past
election  cycles,  by  independent  spending,  mainly  from  corporations  and extremely
wealthy  individuals,  that  in  accord  with  the  Citizens  United  decision  is  formally
independent of candidates’ campaigns. 
48 Privately financed campaigns offer is an inherent advantage for Republicans, the party
that openly adopts pro-rich policies. Democrats face a choice of either aping Republican
positions in hopes of getting campaign contributions from the rich (some of whom do
give to Democrats, mainly on the basis of their positions on social issues such as abortion)
and thereby disillusioning their working class base, or of championing policies that are in
fact if not name social democratic. The latter was the New Deal strategy adopted by FDR
and continued to a lesser extent from Truman through Johnson. Such a strategy was
feasible because Democrats could count on campaign financing and volunteers from labor
unions, which included more than a quarter of the US labor force until the mid-1970s.
Democrats  also  could  count on  receiving  money  from  capitalists  who  adopted  the
pragmatic strategy of donating to incumbents,  which benefited Democrats while they
remained in the majority in Congress until 1980. 
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49 As they lost elections in the 1980s and since, Democrats shifted to the former strategy.
Thus, even the programs they sought to pass over Republican obstructionism offer only
limited  benefits  to  their  actual  and  potential  voters  as  they  guard  capitalists’
profitmaking opportunities. Obamacare is emblematic: millions of uninsured Americans
got access to healthcare through a cumbersome system that was designed to enhance
private  insurance  companies’  profits  at  the  expense  of both the  Federal  budget  and
escalating payments and complexity for the newly insured. On other issues Democrats
adopt neoliberal positions in their effort to attract contributions from the rich, leading
many voters to believe that the differences between the two parties are too small to
justify the effort of voting or to override their cultural affinity with Republicans who
present themselves as anti-elitist. 
50 Such outcomes lead the poor, the young, the nonwhite, and others to question why they
should go to the trouble of obtaining an approved form of identification, wait in long
lines on Election Day, and overcome their disgust at issueless and crude campaigns if all
they will receive, should the Democrats win, is access to complex programs that provide
only  limited  assistance of  the  sort  that  Hillary  Clinton  promised  in  2016  or  Obama
delivered in 2009-10. Now the openness and viciousness of Trump’s attacks on existing
programs have  had the  unintended effect  of  showing voters  what  they  gained from
Obamacare, Dodd-Frank, and other legislation. We will see if that is enough to bring out
more Democratic voters in 2018 and 2020. 
 
Attacks on truth 
51 Trump is more extreme than any previous president, and perhaps than any holder of a
major US office, in the brazenness and frequency of his lies and the extremity with which
he denounces journalists. Yet what Trump is doing is a matter of degree, not something
new. Nixon and Agnew both denounced the press and presented journalists as alien and
un-American. Presidents Johnson and Nixon both told lies; Johnson’s more obvious and
easily refuted than Nixon’s. George W. Bush used the term “fuzzy math” as a response to
Al  Gore’s  attempts  to  expose  the  fraudulent  numbers  behind Bush’s  tax  and budget
proposal in their 2000 presidential campaign. Reagan frequently made up stories. Among
the ones he repeated most often were racist fictions about a “strapping young buck” who
used Food Stamps to buy expensive steaks, and a “Chicago welfare queen [with] eighty
names, thirty addresses, [and] twelve Social Security cards [who] is collecting veteran’s
benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands. She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps,
and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income is over
$150,000" (Haney-Lopez, 2014). 
52 What is different now is the polarization of the media. Nixon and Agnew pushed back
against three television networks that all presented a similar, coherent centrist Cold War
perspective of the world. There were radio stations and newspapers and magazines then
that were more conservative, but all stations were constrained by the Fairness Doctrine, a
Federal Communications Commission rule that required radio and TV stations to give
equal time to the range of opposing political viewpoints contained within the Democratic
and  Republican  parties.  That  rule,  which  prevented  the  emergence  of  doctrinaire
networks,  was  abolished  under  Reagan,  making  possible  both  Fox  and  the  Sinclair
network of rightwing radio and TV stations. 
Trump: authoritarian, just another neoliberal republican, or both?
Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas, 89 | 2019
13
53 Trump supporters are able to live in a closed media environment in which the TV and
radio they hear, and the newspapers, magazines, and websites they read, all present a
single viewpoint. Even within the rightwing world, the stories Trump and his enablers tell
change frequently and have enough internal inconsistencies that it should be possible to
realize that what he is saying is fantasy and lie, but so far his supporters have discounted
or ignored the signs that Trump is untrustworthy. His supporters instead look to the
angry  and anguished responses  to  Trump’s  behavior  and actions  from women,  non-
whites, immigrants, environmentalists, and others and see those reactions as evidence
that Trump is doing the right thing by attacking “elites.” So far, most of Trump’s voters
have yet  to  benefit  from or  be directly  harmed by his  policies  and so either  ignore
detailed analyses of tax cuts, deregulation, etc., or assume that if people they hold in
contempt are upset,  it  means Trump’s is doing right by previously “forgotten” white
Americans. 
54 Trump and his  appointees  use  false  evidence to  support  their  policies  and proposed
regulatory changes. In the past, fraudulent or even unsupported claims were grounds
enough for courts to block changes in policy. It is too early to know how much Republican
appointed judges will let Trump get away with in this regard. The first signs are bad. The
Supreme Court upheld, again 5 to 4,  Trump’s Muslim ban because his Administration
asserted, in the face of Trump’ repeated statements as a candidate and president that he
wanted a “total shutdown” of Muslim immigration to the US, it had other reasons for
stopping travel from eight countries, six of which are almost entirely Muslim. 
55 To the extent to which Trump is able to convince Americans that there is no objective
truth, just points of view or what, when he was selling gaudy real estate, he once called
“truthful hyperbole,” it  will  become impossible to evaluate his or any other official’s
record in office or the meaning of proposed and enacted policies. This sort of attack on
truth is different from overt censorship, which Trump has not as yet attempted. Instead,
the goal is to devalue the impact of investigative journalism and of coherent analyses of
the inconsistencies, falsehoods, and failures of policies put forward by Trump and the
Republicans. 
56 Reality eventually caught up with past liars. The Tet offensive revealed the fantasy of
Johnson’s claims about Vietnam. Nixon was exposed by investigations into the Watergate
scandal. The low approval ratings with which Bush left office in 2009 suggest that the less
conclusive challenges to his claims eventually convinced a majority of Americans. We do
not yet know if any of the investigations of Trump’s long history of fraud will  reach
fruition  (see  Chait,  2008,  for  a  plausible  though  largely  unsupported  argument  that
Trump has been a Soviet/Russian agent since 1987). Certainly if Trump dismisses Mueller
or  uses  his  presidential  pardon  authority  to  free  his  criminal  associates  from  legal
jeopardy  that  would  be  a  profound break  with  all  past  presidential  practice  and,  if
Congress let him get away with that without removing him from office, a clear move
toward authoritarian rule. 
 The future: weak democracy or authoritarianism? 
57 All  of  Trump’s  efforts  to  undermine  American  democracy  so  far  build  on  existing
Republican strategies and accomplishments, which reinforce each other. Restrictions on
voting  rights  and  gerrymandering,  which  give  Republicans  victories  even  when  a
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majority of those who vote or want to vote favor the Democrats, combine with Republican
obstructionism  and  vulgarity  to  demoralize  voters,  further  reducing  the  electorate.
Unlimited political spending by the rich mix with the distortions of networks like Fox and
Sinclair and the lies that Trump tells to convince ever more citizens that there is no way
to  objectively  evaluate  public  officials  and  their  programs’  performance.  Republican
domination of the presidency and Senate allow them to appoint Federal judges who allow
all of these anti-democratic practices. 
58 If Trump’s efforts to restrict voting rights, degrade public discourse, and call into doubt
the very existence of objective truth succeed, he will have advanced US politics further
along a road toward weaker democracy that was paved by other Republican politicians.
The solid five justice conservative majority following confirmation of Trump’s second
Supreme Court nominee will ensure that existing and most conceivable future efforts to
restrict voting rights and gerrymander districts will continue, and that the rich will be
able to inject unlimited amounts of money into political campaigns. 
59 Even if the Democrats retake the House in 2018, and the Senate and presidency in 2020,
US  democracy  will  continue  to  weaken,  as  it  did  during  the  Obama  years.  Only  if
Democrats occupy the presidency for a long period and there is  a string of  amazing
actuarial good luck — 85 year old Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the other three liberal judges
surviving past 2020 and Thomas or another reactionary justice dying — would there be a
liberal Supreme Court majority. Democratic Party control of government would not in
itself  do  anything  to  reverse  the  fundamental  forces  that  weaken  democracy.  The
Democratic Party as currently constituted has shown no interest in strengthening labor
unions: each time Democrats controlled Congress they failed to pass legislation undoing
the provisions of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act that allows states to ban closed union shops or
that  prevent  unions  from investing  the  pension  funds  of  their  members  in  socially
valuable ways (McCarthy, 2017). Nor have Democrats succeeded, with the exception of
Obamacare, in passing any program that could convince potential voters of the need to
turn out for that party in presidential, let alone Congressional and local, elections. Even
Obamacare did not boost voting enough to save Democratic majorities in Congress or to
elect Hillary Clinton as president. 
60 American democracy  could  be  revived  by  the  emergence  of  popular  mobilization  as
happened among workers and farmers in the 1930s and African Americans and students
in the 1960s. Such popular eruptions are unpredictable and today would have to develop
in a country that lacks the nationally-linked community level organizations that existed
in those earlier eras (Skocpol, 2003).  Social movement scholars are unable to identify
conditions that necessarily or even usually lead to upsurges in mobilization, so there is no
guarantee or even likelihood that another economic crisis as bad or worse than that of
2008, a natural disaster to which the government fails to respond, or even defeat in war
would fundamentally affect US politics. We also can’t be sure if left mobilization would
push elites to see an authoritarian Trump as the best way to counteract labor strikes,
demands  for  social  programs,  women’s  and  other  civil  rights,  and  opposition  to  a
militaristic foreign policy. However, since the 1930s US elites have responded to protests
with concessions and thus could see advantage in returning Democrats to power in hopes
that  their  victory  would  quiet  the  left  even as  they  don’t  take  steps  that  endanger
capitalist power. 
61 Could Trump lead the US past weak democracy toward an authoritarian or fascist future?
There is a cottage industry, with Masha Gessen and Timothy Snyder (cited above) as the
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most successful current practitioners, of writers who draw on their particular expertise
about dictatorships past and present to create jumbled, ad hoc lists of “lessons” and signs
of impending tyranny. There is very little reflection in such work on the nature of the
societies  they compare  or  efforts  to  identify  the  differences  that  mattered or  might
matter in determining authoritarian outcomes. 
62 Gessen and Snyder focus on the strong man form of authoritarianism in which a single
ruler undermines democracy and his party plays only a supporting role. Hitler is the
archetype. Putin, Orban, Erdogan, and Chavez fall into this category. Chavez did create a
party that continues to rule after his death. It remains to be seen if the others create any
structures that will endure after their retirements or deaths. But there is another pattern
in which a party builds authoritarian rule and the ruler has only a marginal effect on the
political structure. The Soviet Union after Stalin, much of Eastern Europe, and the PRI in
Mexico fit this pattern. The US Republican Party’s success in undermining democracy and
Trump’s limited effect on policy fit this party-directed authoritarian pattern. 
63 If  we want to determine if  Trump is creating or building upon the preconditions for
fascism we would do well to begin with Michael Mann’s (2004) definition of fascism in
terms of five elements:  nationalism,  statism,  transcendence of class and ethnic conflicts,
accomplished in part by cleansing the nation of enemies through paramilitarism.  Mann
finds that  these elements developed most powerfully,  not  where there was a serious
threat from the left, but where “old regime conservatism, which (more than liberal or
social democracy) was fascism’s main rival…[was] weakened and factionalized” (ibidem:
364). 
64 Mann shows  that  the  “populist”  parties  of  the  late  twentieth  and early  twenty-first
centuries express nationalism and want a cleansing (mainly of immigrants). Trump’s turn
away from the Republican Party’s endorsement of immigration (albeit to meet capitalists’
desire  for  cheap  labor)  and  ICE’s  current  brutality  meet  the  definition  of  cleansing.
However, contemporary extreme rightist parties including the Republicans do not have
significant paramilitaries, which in interwar Europe initially were composed of veterans.
In Europe today there are almost  no veterans since most  of  the continent abolished
conscription decades ago and has not fought any significant wars in the lifetimes of
almost all living citizens. “In 2016, 7% of U.S. adults were veterans, down from 18% in
1980” (Bialik,  2017).  Young people,  who in the 1930s fortified the first fascists of the
1920s, now are the least nationalistic cohorts and the ones most open to multiculturalism
in both Europe and the US. 
65 Most significantly, the right in America, and to a lesser but still  significant degree in
Europe, is opposed to statist policies except for the military and law enforcement. Mann’s
analysis  suggests  that  neoliberalism  in  fact  immunizes  societies  against  fascism  by
delegitimizing  and  foreclosing  statist  social  welfare  programs  (though  not  increased
spending  and  powers  for  the  military  or  the police),  even  as  milder  forms  of
authoritarianism can thrive under neoliberalism. The Republicans do not offer a statist
program. While Trump hinted at statism in his 2016 campaign, as we saw in our review of
his  policies  above  he  has  not  acted  on  any  of  those  tendencies,  and  the  current
Republican majorities in Congress show no sign of wanting to enact any sort of statist
programs.  More  broadly,  as  Dylan  Riley  (2017:  21)  shows,  “Trump  lacks  a  party
organization  [independent  of  the  longstanding  Republican  Party],  a  militia  and  an
ideology; his foreign policy as so far announced is isolationist, rather than revanchist —
and indeed, what territorial losses could the US wish to reverse?” 
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66 Of course, the absence of fascism does not mean Trump or his European allies don’t aspire
to or won’t be able to impose authoritarianism. Yet, the most authoritarian rightwing
governments in Europe are in (no surprise)  the places  with the newest  and weakest
democratic  institutions:  Turkey  and  the  former  Soviet  bloc  countries.  Among  these,
Turkey and to a lesser extent Russia stand out in their ability to imprison, terrorize, and
kill opponents rather than, as the other countries do, confining their efforts (so far) to
weakening their rivals’ ability to win elections. Thus, up to now, the opportunities to
create  authoritarianism  are  just  where  we’d  expect  them.  That  is  why  it  is  just  as
unanalytic to look to Putin’s Russia or Orban’s Hungary for lessons that apply to the US,
as it is to look to Hitler’s Germany. Even if there were proof that Trump is trying to copy
Putin’s or other authoritarians’ techniques, that in itself would not tell us much about the
likelihood that such methods would succeed in the US. 
67 Trump’s descriptions of himself and his rhetoric at his rallies certainly point to a desire to
become  an  authoritarian  leader.  However,  with  the  significant  exception  of  his
government’s  treatment  of  immigrants,  Trump has  been unable  so  far  to  limit  civil
liberties in any way. Yet, authoritarianism has two sides: repression and violation of the
rule of law. Usually authoritarians attempt both, but do not necessarily succeed in both
equally or at the same time. As I noted above, if Trump is allowed to end investigations of
his possible crimes, or if the Supreme Court ultimately allows Trump to pardon himself or
his associates in criminal activities, then the rule of law will be fatally undermined in the
US. It is possible that judges will allow such self-serving behavior even as they uphold
civil liberties. 
68 The good news is that because Trump has not built the paramilitaries or independent
political  movements  that  have  allowed  other  authoritarian  wannabes  to  override
systemic and customary limits on an elected head of government’s power, he remains
dependent on the existing Republican Party to decide how far he can go to aggrandize
himself and what policies he can implement. That party and the economic elites that
support it will  calculate whether they will be better able to remain in office and, for
economic elites,  to pursue their broader interests,  by allowing Trump to increase his
personal power or by forcing him to conform to existing legal norms. Such calculations
can vary from one policy area or one set of legal constraints to another. Ultimately, such
calculations will be affected by the extent of popular mobilization and by the degree to
which ordinary citizens use the ever-narrower terrain of American electoral democracy
to challenge Trump, the Republican Party that empowers him, and elites that benefit
from Republican rule and policies. 
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ABSTRACTS
I review Donald Trump’s actions as president to evaluate the extent to which he differs from
longstanding Republican Party  policies.  I  find that  except  for  trade and immigration he  has
furthered existing Republican desires in the fields of tax cuts,  deregulation, weakening labor
unions, and the appointment of rightwing judges. I then turn to the question of whether Trump
is an authoritarian. I show that while his rhetoric is an escalation of previous Republican racial
demagoguery,  Trump  benefits  more  than  he  adds  to  his  party’s  decades-long  strategy  of
suppressing minority and young voters, vulgarizing political discourse and normalizing brazen
lying by candidates and officials, obstructing Democratic officeholders, and allowing unlimited
campaign spending by rich people and corporations. I conclude that Trump is now the head of an
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increasingly authoritarian political party rather than a self-generated strongman. This reduces
the insights one can gain from comparisons with rulers like Hitler, Putin or Erdogan. 
Revêm-se as ações de Donald Trump enquanto presidente para avaliar até que ponto ele difere
das linhas políticas duradouras do Partido Republicano. Com exceção do comércio e da imigração,
ele  promoveu  os  desejos  republicanos  já  existentes  nos  campos  de  cortes  de  impostos,
desregulamentação, enfraquecimento dos sindicatos de trabalhadores e nomeação de juízes de
direita. De seguida, aborda-se a questão do autoritarismo de Trump. Mostra-se que enquanto a
sua retórica é uma escalada da anterior demagogia racial republicana, Trump beneficia mais do
que  acrescenta  à  estratégia  de  décadas  do  seu  partido  de  reprimir  os  eleitores  jovens  e  as
minorias,  vulgariza o discurso político e normaliza a insolência de candidatos e funcionários,
obstrui os funcionários democratas e permite gastos de campanha ilimitados por pessoas ricas e
por corporações.  Conclui-se que Trump é agora o líder de um partido politico cada vez mais
autoritário em vez de um um homem forte autoproduzido. Isto reduz a perceção que se pode
obter das comparações com governantes como Hitler, Putin ou Erdogan. 
Cet article passe en revue les actions de Donald Trump afin de voir à quel point il s’éloigne des
lignes politiques durables du Parti Républicain. Hormis le commerce et l’immigration, on observe
une augmentation des désirs républicains déjà existants en ce qui concerne les baisses d’impôts,
la déréglementation, l’affaiblissement des syndicats de travailleurs et la nomination de juges de
droite. L’article aborde ensuite la question de l’autoritarisme de Trump. Il montre que tant que sa
rhétorique est une escalade de la démagogie raciale républicaine existante, Trump bénéficie, plus
qu’il n’y ajoute, de la stratégie poursuivie pendant des décennies par son parti de réprimer les
électeurs jeunes et les minorités, il vulgarise le discours politique et normalise l’insolence des
candidats et des fonctionnaires, fait obstruction aux fonctionnaires démocrates et permet des
dépenses  de  campagnes  illimitées  financées  par  de  riches  particuliers  et  des  groupes
économiques. L’étude conclut que Trump est aujourd’hui le leader d’un parti politique de plus en
plus autoritaire au lieu d’un homme fort qui ne doit sa réussite qu’à lui-même. Cela réduit la
perception que l’on peut obtenir des comparaisons avec des gouvernants tels que Hitler, Putin ou
Erdogan. 
Se revisan las acciones de Donald Trump como presidente para evaluar hasta qué punto él difiere
de las líneas políticas duraderas del Partido Republicano. Con excepción del comercio y de la
inmigración  aumentaron  los  deseos  republicanos  ya  existentes  en  términos  de  recortar
impuestos, desreglamentar, debilitar los sindicatos de trabajadores y nominar jueces de derecha.
A continuación, se aborda la cuestión del autoritarismo de Trump. Se muestra que mientras su
retórica es una versión aumentada de la anterior demagogia racial republicana, Trump beneficia
más de lo que aporta de la estrategia de décadas de su partido de reprimir a los electores jóvenes
y  de  las  minorías,  vulgariza  el  discurso  político  y  normaliza  la  insolencia  de  candidatos  y
funcionarios, obstruye a los funcionarios demócratas y permite gastos de campaña ilimitados a
personas ricas y a corporaciones. Se concluye, que Trump es ahora el líder de un partido político
cada vez más autoritario en vez de un hombre fuerte autoproducido. Esto reduce la percepción
que se puede obtener de las comparaciones con gobernantes como Hitler, Putin o Erdogan. 
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